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An investigation by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists found that A7’s cross-border payment network is funded by rubles collected in cash at Moscow markets, then routed through Promsvyazbank, cryptocurrency intermediaries and companies abroad. The report says A7 processed at least 58 metric tons of cash in a single month at its peak; the timing and measurement behind that figure are not specified in the supplied material.
An investigation by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) has described how Russia’s A7 payment service starts some international transfers with bags of rubles collected at Moscow markets, including Sadovod. The reporting says A7’s network moves the cash through Promsvyazbank, cryptocurrency intermediaries and companies abroad, and that the service processed at least 58 metric tons in a single month at its peak.
ICIJ said it reviewed internal company documents and interviewed sources to trace how money enters A7’s network. Its findings, reported in late October, describe brokers at several wholesale and retail markets collecting cash from individuals and businesses. A7’s records call the collection points “departments”; the documents reviewed by the journalists listed at least eight. Sadovod, one of Moscow’s largest markets, was described by a source familiar with the operation as a significant source of customers.
According to the investigation, brokers count the rubles, place them into numbered bags and send them by van, alongside payment instructions, to an A7 processing center elsewhere in Moscow. About 50 cashiers at that center record the cash in A7’s system. The funds are then delivered to Promsvyazbank (PSB), which holds the cash and credits A7’s accounts, the report says.
From there, the reported route uses intermediary companies registered abroad. The investigation says companies in Kyrgyzstan buy cryptocurrency through Grinex, an exchange linked to A7. Intermediaries in other countries, often in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, then convert the cryptocurrency into local currencies and send funds to recipients. The source material gives no date or measurement method for the reported peak of 58 metric tons in one month, so it should be read as a reported cash volume rather than a measure of transfers or their value.
How the Cash Route Works
The reporting matters because it offers a detailed account of how cross-border payments can continue despite restrictions on conventional financial channels. The route described by ICIJ begins with cash inside Russia and passes through a Russian bank, cryptocurrency transactions and overseas intermediaries before reaching recipients. That sequence helps explain how a service can connect Russian customers with foreign suppliers while obscuring the original source of funds along the way.
The implications extend beyond payment logistics. A separate investigation by Proekt, summarized in the supplied material, found that A7’s client list included at least 25 Russian companies under U.S. and European Union sanctions; five were described as manufacturers or suppliers of combat drones used by Russia’s military in Ukraine. Those findings raise questions about whether payment networks such as A7 can support trade involving sanctioned firms. The material does not establish that every A7 transaction served a sanctioned client or involved military goods.
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Sanctions and A7’s Growth
A7 emerged as sanctions and Russia’s disconnection from the SWIFT messaging system after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine disrupted established channels for international payments. The supplied account says shadow intermediaries offering cross-border transfers then expanded, with many based in Moscow’s Moscow City business district. Proekt reported on that market in spring 2026.
A7 is described as the largest player in this market. Its controlling stake belongs to Moldovan businessman Ilan Shor, whom the source material says was convicted of fraud and embezzlement in Moldova; the remaining 49% belongs to the state-owned Promsvyazbank. The material also says the state development corporation VEB.RF provides support to A7. Proekt’s account attributes estimates of A7’s market share to sources: one put it at about 15% of Russian cross-border transfers, while the company claimed 19%. These are attributed estimates, not independently verified figures in the supplied reporting.
The market collection method builds on practices that predated the sanctions. The source material says intermediaries at Sadovod already converted cash into bank transfers or cryptocurrency, often for payments to China. A7’s reported system expanded that activity into a more organized chain involving cash collection, bank processing and overseas intermediaries.
“Sadovod is simply a big client base.”
— A source familiar with A7’s operations, speaking to ICIJ
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Questions About the Network
The supplied reporting does not specify when the 58-metric-ton monthly peak occurred, how the cash was weighed, or whether the figure covers all A7 collection points. It also does not provide a complete accounting of the total value of transfers, the number of payments, or the proportion that reached sanctioned companies.
The described routes and corporate links are based on investigative reporting, documents and sources; the material does not include responses from A7 or PSB to the specific findings about cash collection and transfer processing. Proekt reported that Abramovich may have a role in A7, citing unnamed sources and circumstantial links, but his representatives denied involvement. The available account does not establish that he directs or funds the service. It also remains unclear how much of the reported network is still operating, and whether regulators have taken action in response to the findings.
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Scrutiny of A7’s Payment Routes
The next developments to watch are whether financial regulators or sanctions authorities respond to the reporting, and whether further information emerges about A7’s overseas intermediaries, customers and transaction volumes. The supplied material does not describe a new enforcement action, official investigation or response from A7 tied to the ICIJ findings.
Further reporting or official disclosures could clarify the timing and scope of the cash-volume estimate, how the Kyrgyzstan and third-country entities are connected to A7, and whether the reported routes have changed. Until such details are made public, the investigation provides a documented account of the system described by its sources and records, but not a full measure of its present activity or the status of every transfer.
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Key Questions
What is A7?
A7 is a Russian cross-border payment service described in the reporting as a major operator in the shadow payments market. The supplied material says Ilan Shor holds a controlling stake and state-owned Promsvyazbank owns the remaining 49%.
How does the reported payment process work?
According to ICIJ, brokers collect rubles at Moscow markets, send numbered bags of cash to an A7 processing center, and then transfer the funds through Promsvyazbank and cryptocurrency intermediaries before overseas companies convert and send money to recipients.
What does the 58-metric-ton figure refer to?
The source material says A7 processed at least 58 metric tons in a single month at its peak. It does not state when that month was, how the cash volume was measured, or what share of the company’s total activity it represents.
Did the reporting prove that every A7 transfer evaded sanctions?
No. The investigation describes routes intended to facilitate international transfers and reports that A7’s clients included at least 25 U.S.- or EU-sanctioned Russian companies. The supplied material does not show that every transfer involved a sanctioned company or establish the purpose of every payment.
Source: rss
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